A general equation for equilibrium sex allocation is provided which models asymmetries between son and daughter in the costs of offspring production, the genetic relatedness to the controlling genotype and the amount of competition for mating opportunities and reproductive resources. A genetic proof is given which is valid for diploid and haplodiploid systems with a variety of modes of sex allocation control, provided sib mating is the only source of inbreeding. By way of example, some variations of Hamilton's (1967) model are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
) discussed a sex allocation model in which there was partial sib-mating and a variety of genetic sex ratio control mechanisms. My purpose is to provide a condition (3) for equilibrium sex allocation which generalises both his work and the standard Shaw-Mohler (1953) formula df dm fm Roughly speaking, the equilibrium equation is that which would be obtained from a non-genetic, game-theoretic analysis of the problem, using relatedness coefficients. Indeed I will point out that if w is the fitness function belonging to such a model then the equilibrium equation is simply the condition, dw 0, that w be stationary. The equilibrium condition allows identification of the three principal factors which cause sex ratio bias, these being son-daughter asymmetries in 1) offspring production, 2) offspring genotype, 3) breeding opportunities. The magnitude of the last two may be affected by the level of inbreeding, but inbreeding per se has no effect on sex ratio equilibrium. I provide a precise genetic proof of the result. I do not consider in this paper the question of stability. In stage two, the offspring generation mates to produce next generation mated females. I denote by P the probability that a female at the end of stage one breeds, and by Q the expected number of mates which breed of a stage one male. Then Q = Pf/m if the whole population employs the allocation (f m). For simplicity I assume a mated female has only one mate, but this restriction is lifted in the discussion.
I assume that a female chooses her mate either from her brothers or at random in the population. Thus sib-mating is the only source of inbreeding. I assume offspring are made from the mated female genotype in the standard way: one haploid gamete from each parent. Thus our assumptions rule out more general forms of inbreeding, such as first cousin or father-daughter, and such phenomena as laying workers.
Control of sex allocation
The value of the allocation parameter r employed by a mated female is determined as follows. She first manufactures a control genotype using genetic material of herself and her mate, following fixed selection rules, and the value of r is then determined by the genotype of the control individual at a single locus, which we refer to as the control locus, which may he autosomal or sex-linked. The control genotype maybe simply one of the parents, or may he a duaghter or a son or some probabilistic mixture of these. For example, to model the much studied phenomenon of worker control of sex ratio in a haplodiploid population, we take a daughter as the control genotype and the control locus to be on the X-chromosome. We will assume the control genotype is either haploid or diploid.
I denote by R1• and R,,, the spec(fic (to the control locus) relatedness of the control genotype to the daughters and sons respectively of the mated female. That is, R1 is the expected number of copies (identical by descent) in a daughter, of a random allele at the control locus in the control genotype, and Rm is the same for a son. R1 and R,,, depend on the level of inbreeding.
These relatedness coefficients are not in standard usage, but they are the most natural objects for our model. They are closely related to Falconer's (1960) coancestry, the probability that two alleles drawn at random from each of two individuals are identical by descent. If we let c1 and c,,, be the specific (to the control locus) coancestry of the control genotype and a daughter and son respectively, then R, = crr1 and R,,, = where and are the specific (at the control locus) ploidies of female and male.
The inbreeding coefficient Define the inbreeding coefficient F to be the probability that uniting gametes are identical by descent at a random locus. I remark that for partial sibmating, it does not matter whether the locus in question is autosomal or X-linked in both cases F = s/(4 -3s) where s is the probability of sibmating (Li 1955) . At equilibrium F is also the probability that the two alleles at a random (autosomal or X-linked) locus in a diploid individual are identical by descent.
As an example of the relatedness coefficients, consider the case of X-linked control (isomorphic to haplodiploidy an X-allele in a son is the same as a random X-allele in the mother. The daughter coefficients are straight averages of the previous two, since a random Xallele in a daughter is in mother or father each with probability 1/2.
It is of interest to observe the effect of F on the R,/R,, ratio. In the case of control by the mother, the ratio is near I for small F and increases to 2 at F I. For control by father or daughter, the ratio is larger for small F and decreases to 2 at F= I.
The equilibrium equation
Suppose the entire population is employing a certain allocation r which is an interior point of the range [0, 1]. The equilibrium condition (3) is a necessary condition for this strategy to be evolutionarily stable, that is, resistant to invasion by any rare mutant strategy r'. It is a local condition, assuming not only that r' is rare, but that it is close to r. I formulate the condition in differential form.
Specifically, I assume a single wild type allele at the control locus coding for strategy r, and a rare mutant allele which codes for r'. I consider r fixed and imagine r' to be variable, and near r.
The case r' = r, for which the mutation causes no phenotypic change, will be important.
A mated female will be called mutant if she has at least one mutant allele in her (tetraploid) genotype, but she may or may not employ strategy r, depending on the control genotype. If she does use r', she will be called deviant. In this case she makes.f' daughters and m' sons, and I will denote by P' the probability that each of her daughters breed and by Q' the expected number of breeding mates of each of her sons. In general P and Q' will depend on both r' and r.
To get the equilibrium condition, let r' be a differential change from r, r'= r+dr, and let df dm, dP and dQ be the corresponding differential changes off', in', P' and Q' fromf m, P and Q. I emphasize this is a necessary condition for an evolutionarily stable interior value of the sex allocation parameter r. In practice it allows us to locate all interior stationary points, and stability is then checked separately.
Let me remark that in a game-theoretic model we would try to write down an expression for the fitness w' of the control of a deviant female, and the most obvious candidate would be w' = Rjf'P' + Rmm'Q'. Then, noting thatfP = mQ, (3) is just the condition dw =0.
Three factors causing sex ratio bias
The objective of the evolutionary game is to project genes into future generations, and in a sexual population, one has a choice between placing ones genes, initially, in daughters or sons. Sex ratio bias may be caused by any son-daughter asymmetry in this process. In this model, I class the asymmetries which lead to sex ratio bias into three types.
The first type belongs to stage one and is reflected by asymmetry in the f-m tradeoff curve (about the line f= m). This type is accounted for already in the Shaw-Mohler equation (1). The classic linear tradeoff f= I -r, m r, is symmetric and leads to a ratio of r= 1/2.
The second type of asymmetry is genetic and is tied to the locus of control. In our equilibrium equation (3) shows that the equilibrium point of (3) is shifted away from that of (4) towards higherf values, for most tradeoff curves, certainly for those which are linear (df/dm = constant) or concave-down (df/dm decreasing with m).
An important special case of X-control is, as I have pointed out, haplodiploidy. If there is no inbreeding then under maternal control R-= R, and under daughter ("worker") control Rf = 3R,.
But if there is some inbreeding then these relationships change as in (2). The third type of asymmetry belongs to the mating and breeding phase, and measures sex differences in breeding opportunities. This factor is measured by dP/P and dQ/Q and may be referred to as local mate competition or more generally, local (reproductive) resource competition. If all females mate and if males disperse to mate, then dP = 0 = dQ and (3) beomes df dm R-+R,,,-=0. dQ/drn <0, and (3) will yield a higher f value than (5). Similarly, if a shift towards daughters results in fewer breeding opportunities for each daughter, then dP/df<0, and (3) will yield a higher m value than (5).
Example: variations on Hamilton's model To calculate Q' we need to know the mating structure; it is not enough to know the level of inbreeding. For example in Hamilton's (1967) model, N unrelated mated females colonise a patch and produce offspring who mate at random before the females disperse to find new colonies. Then a deviant mated female will be the only one in her patch, and, assuming all females mate (P' = P = 1) the number of mates of each of her sons is (N-l)f+f' (6) (N-l)m+m" (4) and Q =f/m, the female/male ratio. Note that Q' depends on both r' and r. Taking differentials (r'=r+dr) we get obtained by Hamilton (1967 and 1979) and Taylor and Bulmer (1980) .
I now mention two or three variations of
Hamilton's model to assist in the understanding of local resource competition. First we remove all local mate competition, but retain some inbreeding. Suppose some fixed proportion q of all males are winged and disperse to breed. (Hamilton 1979 offers some evidence for such male dimorphism.)
The remaining males each mate with a single female (assuming there are always enough to go round) and the unmated females disperse to mate at random with the winged male population. Then the number of mates per son of a deviant female is
and is equal to Q. So dQ = 0, there is no local mate competition, and (5) applies. But there is still partial sib-mating, and hence inbreeding. As another variation suppose the males mate on the patch when small and the mated females continue to grow on the patch until dispersal, so that each patch can only produce a fixed number M of females. Then M M (N-l)m+m (N-l)f+f (10) and (3) becomes dff l\ dm1 l\
f\ NJ rn\ NJ Cancelling the I -I/N, we get equation (5) again, but we should not say there is no local resource competition, but rather that there is no malefemale asymmetry in this regard. The differentials dP and dQ are both non-zero, but their contributions cancel.
This second variation also provides a model for a finite population (with M breeding sites) and random mating. Of course, eventually, such a population is completely inbred, but the equilibrium sex ratio (in the absence of genetic or production asymmetries) is still . Indeed Fisher's classicial sex ratio argument (1930) does not require either an infinite population, or outbreeding, but only random mating. As a third variation suppose the females are still limited to M per patch, but the males disperse early to breed. So there is no inbreeding and Q' Q, but P' is still given by (10), and dfl l\ dm R, l)+Rm=0 (12) giving a male bias over (5). Another example of local resource competition in females (in primates) has been described by Clark (1978) . Thus while the magnitude of the local resource competition often depends on the level of inbreeding, the inbreeding should in no way be regarded as causing this component (or any other!) of sex ratio bias.
DISCUSSION
Nonacs (1985) has reviewed sex allocation phenomenon in ants and has argued that genetic relatedness asymmetries (differences between R and Rm) appear more significant than local mate competition (differences in P and Q) in causing sex ratio bias in these populations. A model such as (3) which combines these phenomena into one equation, should make it easier to compare their significance in a quantitative manner. The determination of the amount of inter-colony breeding in these populations is seen to be rather important, as it has an effect on both factors.
The equilibrium equation (3) (1) More general systems of inbreeding. The terms of (3) all make sense for more general systems than sib-mating, and we can ask if (3) still applies. I would guess yes, but the genetic proof will be more complex. My method of argument relies on having "individuals" (they are my mated females) whose offspring do not interact with the offspring of other genetically related individuals during the course of development up to the time of formation of the next generation of individuals. This is more difficult to accomplish with inbreeding that crosses sib boundaries.
(2) Multiple mating. I assumed every mated female had a unique mate, but this assumption can be removed by expanding our notion of type of mutant mated female. For example, if we assume every female has two mates with equal contribution, then a mated female has a ploidy of 6 (or 4 with X-control) and we have many more mutant types. The relatedness of the control to the offspring will now change and must be carefully worked out. Even variable numbers of mates can be handled in this way. So our equation (3) is valid for multiple matings, but care must be taken with R1 and Rm. (3) Multiple controls. This problem is more difficult. If a large population of control individuals is constructed (e.g., workers) then some assumptions must be made on how different control genotypes will interact. The assumption of "behavioural additivity", that each control individual gets an equal fraction of the reproductive resources and uses its own r on that fraction, leads to our equation, but only really makes sense for the linear tradeoff case f= 1 -r, m = r. In the absence of behavioural additivity things can get complicated. Some recent work is discussed by Bulmer (1983) . (4) Laying workers. I have assumed offspring are made in the standard way: one gamete from each parent. If this assumption is relaxed, equation (3) may fail. The assumption is needed in the argument that identifies the left eigenvector v. An example which demonstrates the failure of equation (3) is found in the phenomenon of laying workers in haplodiploidy, under queen control of sex allocation. This has been studied by a number of authors, Trivers and Hare (1976) , Charnov (1978) and Taylor (1981) , to name but a few. It is equivalent to diploid X-control in which a daughter is permitted to use a portion of the colony's resources to make male offspring of her own. Following Taylor (1981) , suppose the daughter gets /3 males for every offspring made by the mated female. With a linear tradeoff, f= 1-r and m = r+/3 are the female and male outputs. An examination of the argument for the equation (3) shows that the values of R and R,,, used should be those which apply to the extra df and dm offspring. Thus R = Rm = 1/2. Then assuming outbreeding, equation (3) gives -l/(l-r)+l/(r+f3)0, and r=(l-/3)/2, whereas the correct answer (Taylor, 1981) is r= (l/2)-(13/4). Finally I emphasise that any solution of (3) must be checked for stability and this is often not easy analytically, and may require reverting to the technicalities of the genetic model and working with the matrix A, something (3) has circumvented.
In many applications, a computer check may be reasonable.
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APPENDIX
Derivation of the equilibrium equation (3) We keep track of the frequency of the mutant allele by keeping track of the population of mutant mated females from one generation to the next. Our assumptions that the mutation is rare and sibmating is the only source of inbreeding, allow us to assign each mutant mated female to a single mutant mated ancestor one generation back, and this effectively allows us to count mutant genes. There will be different types of mutant mated females depending on the configuration of mutant alleles. For example, under X-control, there are 5 types which we designate by (2, 1), (2, 0), (1, 1), (1,0) and (0, 1), the first and second entries being the number of mutant alleles in mother and father respectively. Denote by a1 the number of mutant mated females of type i which derive from a single type j, in one generation, and let A' denote the matrix of the a. The entries of A' depend on r and r' and the rate of increase of the mutant allele frequency is given by its dominant eigenvalue A'. If r'=r+dr, then A'=A+dA and A'=A+dA and the condition that r be stationary is dA = 0. This is equivalent to vdAu=0 where v and u are the left and right dominant eigenvectors of A (Bulmer and Taylor 1981) . For example, with X-control, A' is 5 x5 and, for the case of sib-mating with probability 1/N, is given by Taylor and Bulmer (1980) . I now interpret the eigenvectors u and u of A, These interpretations are strongly analogous to the interpretations of the right and left eigenvectors of the Leslie matrix in demography as stable age structure and reproductive value vectors (Goodman, 1967) . First if n is the number of mated females of type i, then the number after one generation is ñ, = a1n,. At asymptotic proportions = An, (we assume r' = r), which tells us that u, the frequency of type i mutant mated females is the dominant right eigenvector of A, Au =Au.
The key lemma behind the identification of v is that if r' = r, then at asymptotic proportions every mutant allele in a mated female genotype contributes the same expected number of copies to the next generation. This result, first observed by Hamilton (1967) v=(3, 2, 2, 1,1). These interpretations of the eigenvectors allow me to formulate an important heuristic. Suppose the mutant gene behaves normally (r'= r) and has reached asymptotic proportions u. Let it express altered behaviour r) for a single generation. Let E' be the expected mutant gene contribution to the next generation of a random mutant mated female. Then E' = vA'u.
The equilibrium condition (13) Let p1 be the probability that a mutant mated female of type I is deviant, that is, actually expresses the mutation, and makes (f', rn) offspring instead of (f rn). The p vector will depend on the control mechanisms, both locus and genotype, and on dominance assumptions about the control genotype. For example with maternal X-control, we have p = (1, 1, 1, 1,0) for a dominant mutation and p = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0) for a recessive mutation. For sister control, p = (I, 1,1, , I) and p = (1, 0, , 0, 0) are the dominant and recessive pvectors respectively. Also let x1 and y, he the expected number of mutant alleles in a daughter and son, respectively, of a type I mutant mated female. For example, with X-control, x(2, 1, , , 1) and y-=(1, 1, , , 0). Then E'=> (p,P'j'+(l -p,)PJ)xu,
Now let z he the expected number of mutant alleles in a type j control genotype. It is easy to argue that for any haploid control (such as paternal X-or Y-control), z1 =p, and for a diploid control, + p7 where p' and p" are the deviant probabilities for a dominant and recessive mutation respectively. Let E, and E be the dominant and recessive versions of E'. Note that (for r' = r) E = E, = E = PJ + Qrni7, where and are the average numbers of mutant genes per daughter and son of mutant mated female (the average taken with the type frequencies u corresponding to the case r' = px1u1 p7x1u1 pyuj p7y1u1 r). It follows that when is (EIEd)+(EHEr)
where p' and p" belong to dominant arid recessive mutations respectively? If (20) holds then both Now define = zu1 to be the average (with sides will equal R/R, and any solution to (3) will = r) number of mutant genes in a control
give a candidate for an ESS. If (20) does not hold, genotype, and notice that the solutions of (3) will not be biologically meaningful and there will not in general (for general = z1x1u3/5 m tradeoff curves) be an ESS r which is a "pure and strategy" for the population. In this case we expect the ESS to be mixed; at equilibrium two or more Rm = ZjyjUj/z values of r will be found in the population, and the analysis becomes more difficult.
Indeed this follows from the observation that a Note that for the case of autosomal control, random mutant allele in a control genotype will x1=y1 and (20) value of r must be stationary for both dominant X-control and when the control genotype is a and recessive mutants, that is, indifferential form daughter or son each with probability . That is, (r'= r+dr), (15) must hold for both Ed and Er, the first offspring is male or female with equal and (19) gives dw = 0 which is equivalent to (3).
probability, and controls the sex ratio of the brood. The key to the simplification of (17) was that for equilibrium point given by (3) 
